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1. Introduction 
 
Historical accounts of the evolution in school regulation all around the world suggest 
that this is a policy issue subject of bitter confrontations. Two questions emerge as 
important: on the one hand, what is the role that private schools should play in the 
provision of education. On the other hand, what is the role regional governments 
should play in the provision of education. In countries where the Roman Catholic 
Church is still an important actor in social life, the first question is basically centred 
on the role, if any, private schools run by Catholic Church should play in education, 
and whether these schools should be financed with public funds. The institutional 
answers are different on this point between two countries, like Italy and Spain, 
where the Roman Catholic Church is still considered a sort of “state religion”. In 
Italy, starting from the Unification in the second half of the XIX century, there was 
a strong push towards a public free-for-all education centrally provided. In Spain, 
after the success of Franco’s coup d’etat in 1939, the Catholic Church is still receiving 
a high share of public funds. As for the second question, Italy and Spain have also 
followed different paths with regard to decentralization patterns. In the last thirty 
years Spain has moved from being a unitary state to a much more decentralized one, 
with the regions (Comunidades Autónomas) having Parliaments and Governments 
that can decide on a broad range of public services, among which educational 
services represent a large share of regional public expenditures. On the other hand, 
Italian regional governments (Regioni) play, in general, a minor role in deciding over 
public expenditures; with regard to school funding, this is consistent with the 
process of centralization and secularization of education undertaken in Italy. 
Given these combinations of private funds (coming from households paying a price 
for educational services) and public funds (both from regional and central 
governments), it is not clear how the “accountability effects” suggested by the 
literature on private markets and fiscal federalism impact on the production of 
education. The goal of the paper is to explore this issue. In particular, we study the 
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disciplining role of both market forces and regional governments’ own resources in 
the provision of educational services. We exploit two different sources of variation: 
on the one hand, the difference between private and public schools suggests that – in 
the presence of standardised national tests to assess the level of students’ 
achievements – private schools should be more productive than public schools in 
providing better attainments, given that households pay a price to access the 
service. This first “market-accountability” effect should be stronger the higher the 
share of funding coming directly from markets. On the other hand, the difference 
between schools funded with regional governments resources and schools centrally 
funded suggests that – according to second generation fiscal federalism theories – the 
former should be more productive than the latter, given the “fiscal-accountability” 
role played by own resources for regional governments. The historical evolution of 
school regulation in Italy and Spain, in particular regarding the funding of private 
schools run by Roman Catholic Church and the role of regional governments, 
created different institutions in terms of both dimensions, private funds and regional 
governments funds. We take advantage of these institutional diversities to estimate 
the disciplining role of different sources of funds in the context of educational 
production function using PISA data. 
We build on two papers. First, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) provide empirical 
evidence on the claim that fiscal decentralisation promotes - amongst other benefits - 
the productive efficiency in the delivery of government services. The evidence is 
based on a data-set of Swiss cantons. The authors first offer careful evidence that 
expenditure decentralisation is a powerful proxy for factual regional/local 
autonomy. Further panel regressions on Swiss cantons supply then robust evidence 
that more decentralisation is associated with higher educational attainment. They 
also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types, but that 
male students benefited more from educational decentralisation closing, for the 
Swiss case, the gender education gap. Finally, they present evidence of the 
importance of competence in government and how it can reinforce the gains from 
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decentralisation. Here we add to this paper by considering tax decentralisation and 
not expenditure decentralisation in the analysis of efficiency in educational spending, 
noting that the former should be the real source of accountability for regional 
governments according to recent literature on fiscal federalism (e.g., Oates, 2005; 
Weingast, 2009). Our aim is to study whether regions with more tax autonomy are 
more productive in terms of education attainment. 
Second, West and Woessmann (2010) argue that nineteenth-century Catholic 
doctrine strongly opposed state schooling. The authors show that countries with 
larger shares of Catholics in 1900 (but without a Catholic state religion like Italy or 
Spain) tend to have larger shares of privately operated schools even today. They use 
this historical pattern as a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of 
contemporary private competition on student achievements in cross-country 
student-level analyses. Results show that larger shares of privately operated schools 
lead to better student achievements in mathematics, science and reading, and to 
lower total education spending, even after controlling for current Catholic shares. 
We add to West and Woessmann (2010) by showing that within countries with 
Catholic state religion, there are strong differences in public and private schools 
depending both on historical reasons and the degree of fiscal decentralisation. Indeed, in 
Italy, private schools are only partially financed by the state and play a minor role 
in the provision of education. The opposite occurs in Spain, where schools run by the 
Roman Catholic Church represent a relevant share of total educational supply 
(about 30% of children attend private schools, the great majority of which are 
operated by the Roman Catholic Church) and are still now highly financed by the 
state. Our aim is to study - besides regional funding - the role of public/private 
funding in increasing school accountability. 
Results obtained by estimating an education production function using PISA data 
for 2003 on the sample of Italian and Spanish regions provide support to both the 
“market-accountability” and the “fiscal-accountability” effects. In particular, we 
find that a larger share of private funding and a a larger share of local public funding 
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are consistently associated with better outcomes. Moreover, we find evidence on the 
role played by a national standardised test in providing adequate incentives to 
improve schools’ performance. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction on schooling systems in Italy and Spain, along both an historical and 
an institutional perspective. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy, and presents 
the PISA data and our estimates, adding robustness tests and a brief policy 
discussion. Section 4 collects the final remarks. 
 
2. Italy and Spain: historical and institutional differences 
 
2.1 Educational systems 
 
While sharing a number of cultural traits characterising the Mediterranean 
countries, Italy and Spain show large institutional differences rooted in the historical 
evolution of the two countries. Limiting the analysis to schooling, one can show two 
important sources of variation: on the one hand, the role of private schools; on the 
other hand, the role of fiscal decentralisation and regional funding for schools. The 
present day situation is the result of different historical patterns. 
The Italian school system has been heavily influenced after the unification of the 
country in 1861 by the Coppino Law promulgated in 1877. This law has been 
introduced by a left-wing government headed by Agostino Depretis, establishing 
two basic principles: first, free-of-charge elementary schooling for all the citizens, 
with municipalities responsible of maintaining and funding schools; second, 
compulsory education for all, with sanctions and fines for all the citizens not 
attending schools. The implicit aim of this model was to create a national identity in 
a country with substantial differences across regions. Catholics strongly criticised 
this law with a secular taste that excluded religion from curricula in public schools, 
and sent their children to private institutions run by the Catholic Church. The 
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compulsory free-for-all public schooling system designed at the end of the XIX 
century was further emphasised by the Republican Constitution in 1948. Despite the 
contribution of different layers of governments, decisions and funding were almost 
totally centralised. The Constitution also stated that it is possible to establish and 
run private schools, but without any financial burden for the state. This is a formula 
that was (and still is) subject to bitter debates in the following years, with 
supporters of the public schools strongly opposing to any transfers of public funds to 
private schools, especially the religious ones. The Italian schooling system was 
subjected to a number of different reforms since then, but none of them changed the 
two fundamental principles of a compulsory and free-of-charge public school 
centrally managed and financed. Only in the proposed constitutional reform of 2005, 
schooling has been thought as an exclusive responsibility of Regional government 
like health care (that in Italy is the most important task devolved to Regions). 
However, a national referendum rejected this project, confirming the favour towards 
a highly centralised public schooling. 
The Spanish schooling system followed a different route, with the Catholic Church 
playing a more or less prominent role according to the specific historical period. The 
1812 Constitution established that schooling was the basic responsibility of the state. 
However, throughout the XIX century, liberals and conservatives engaged in bitter 
battles over educational issues and the role of the Catholic Church. In particular, the 
Revolution of 1868 and the subsequent advent of the First Republic pointed to the 
importance of academic freedom, and the separation of the Church and the State in 
education matters. While in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (1874 - 1931), the 
conservatives sought to re-establish the Catholic Church control in education, 
supported by a series of Concordats with the Vatican that went in the direction of 
solidifying the relationship between the State and the Catholic Church. The new 
Constitution, promulgated with the advent of the Second Republic in 1931, revoked 
the 1851 Concordat with the Vatican – which established Catholicism as the official 
state religion in Spain – and brought new important educational reforms, including 
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the call for free compulsory primary education and non-religious instruction. All 
these changes came to an end with the failure of the Republic and the success of the 
fascist forces of General Franco at the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939. During 
subsequent years, education in Spain was converted into the transmission of 
Franco’s views of Spanish Nationalism and Catholic ideology, and the power of the 
Catholic Church was restored with the approval of the 1952 Concordat. This 
agreement had important implications for education: Catholic religious instruction 
was to be mandatory in all schools, even in the public ones; moreover, the Catholic 
Church was given the right to establish their own universities. With the democratic 
regime following Franco’s death (1975), some laws were issued aiming at reducing 
the role of state subsidies for education. In particular, in 1990, there was a profound 
reform of the educational system (Law on the General Organization of the Educational 
System – LOGSE) that tried to take into account the new reality of Spain, which was 
no longer a centralized but an increasingly decentralized state, with some regions 
having competencies to legislate on education from the early eighties. However, the 
issues surrounding government subsidies to Catholic Church education had not been 
resolved and, at the end of the XX century, the government continued (and still 
continue) to subsidize private church-affiliated schools.  
 
2.2 Decentralization patterns 
 
As for fiscal decentralisation, Italy and Spain have also followed different patterns. 
Nowadays, considering taxes and revenues defined by regional governments, Italy 
can be considered a “centralized” country compared to Spain. IMF data from 
Government Finances Statistics show that sub-central governments in Italy 
(including regions, provinces and municipalities) account in 2007 for around 28% of 
total revenue and 27% of total spending. On the contrary, in Spain, the 1978 
democratic Constitution created the Comunidades Autónomas (CA) as an 
intermediate level of government aimed at recognizing the internal heterogeneity of 
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the country. This level of government soon took responsibility over matters related 
to the Welfare State, such as education and health, that were before in the hands of 
the central government. In 2005, IMF figures show that 55.3% of total spending in 
Spain is decided by the central government, while the remaining 44.7 refers to sub-
central governments (31.6% to regional governments, and 13.1% to local 
governments). 
With respect to decentralization in education, the share of funding coming from 
regional governments is very different between Italy and Spain. In Italy, only 
schools belonging to the two Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano (de facto, 
two regional governments) are financed by own regional funds, while schools in the 
other regions are almost totally financed by the Central government. For instance, 
the Provincial Law n. 5/2006 disciplines the educational system in the province of 
Trento, by assigning full autonomy (including financial autonomy) to each school. It 
also introduces additional tools for evaluating at the provincial level the 
productivity of schools. Notice that fiscal decentralisation results in a higher share of 
income devoted to public education: the spending-to-GDP ratio for schooling was 
6.2% in the Autonomous Province of Trento in 2002, while 4.7% in Italy. At the 
national level, available statistics for 2003 shows that more than 82.7% of total 
spending in education is allocated at the central level, 2.3% is decided by regional 
governments and 15% by local governments (see, e.g., MIUR, 2007). In Spain, 
regions such as Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia and 
Comunidad Valenciana received responsibility over education between 1980 and 
1983 for primary and secondary schools, and between 1985 and 1987 for higher 
education. Navarra received responsibility for all schools’ grades in 1990. The 
remaining regions joined between 1995 and 2000. In 2005, IMF figures show that in 
Spain 4.5% of total spending devoted to education is decided by the central 
government; 89.5% by regional governments, and 6% by local governments. 
In the remainder of the paper, we exploit these institutional differences in terms of 
the role played by public funds in financing private schools and of fiscal 
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decentralisation in order to identify the “accountability effects” played by both 
market forces and (regional) tax autonomy. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
3.1. The strategy 
 
According to the institutional differences described in the previous Section, we 
basically have two important sources of variation to identify the impact of the two 
accountability mechanisms: 
 
a. The first one is the degree of fiscal decentralisation, which is different within 
Italy, between ordinary statute regions and the Autonomous Provinces of 
Trento and Bolzano; and between Italy and Spain. The degree of fiscal 
decentralisation is important because, as suggested, for instance, by Oates 
(2005) and Weingast (2009), the higher the share of funding provided by 
regional governments to finance services to citizens, the lower the Vertical 
Fiscal Imbalance, the higher their accountability, hence the efficiency of 
public spending. In terms of schooling, we should expect that an higher 
degree of fiscal decentralisation will lead to improved outcomes. 
 
b. The second source of variation is the public/private dimension, which is 
different between Spain and Italy both for the role assigned to private 
providers of education and, more importantly, to public funding of these 
private schools. In particular, private schools in Spain (especially escuelas 
concertadas) are an important actor in the national education system and are 
consistently financed with public funds (e.g., Calero and Escardíbul, 2007), 
whereas private schools in Italy (both secular and religious schools) play a 
minor and residual role, and receive a relatively little financial support from 
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the government. Besides public funding, the private nature of schools is 
important in itself, especially in the presence of a nationally administered 
test. As suggested by Woessmann et al. (2009), external exams increase 
schools’ accountability along several dimensions, including the enhanced 
monitoring of teachers and schools. This effect should be stronger the higher 
the share of educational costs paid by citizens. However, while in Spain, at 
the end of secondary (non compulsory) education, there is a unique (global) 
exam for students aiming at enrolling in a university course (selectividad), 
similar evaluation exercises have not been systematically introduced so far in 
Italy. 
 
Starting from these premises, the disciplining effects stemming from both fiscal 
decentralisation and market incentives provide a ranking of different types of 
schools in terms of accountability: 
 
i. At one extreme, Italian private schools are those financed mostly with 
fees paid by households (i.e., they are “private-independent” schools; e.g., 
Dronkers and Avram, 2009; Dronkers and Robert, 2008). In principle, 
then, market forces should strongly discipline them. However, this 
argument can be displaced by the fact that – in the absence of a national 
standardised test on attainment in Italy – these schools do not need to be 
as productive in terms of education as they should be in the presence of 
an external exam, just providing students with a “certificate” to enter the 
labour market. That private schools will provide lower quality education 
than public schools is not only theoretically feasible, but also somewhat 
consistent with available evidence (e.g., Bertola et al., 2007, and Brunello 
and Rocco, 2008). 
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ii. At the other extreme, Italian public schools in ordinary statute regions 
are financed (almost) completely and staffed completely by the Central 
government. They are not subject to any evaluation program, and enjoy 
a very modest degree of autonomy over their budget. According to the 
theory, they should be the less accountable type of school. 
 
iii. In between, we have Spanish public and private schools and Italian 
public schools in the Autonomous Provinces of Bolzano and Trento. Their 
degree of accountability should increase with the share of funding coming 
from the market (in the presence of nationally administered external 
exams) and from regional governments. Notice that Spanish private 
schools are mostly “private government dependent” schools (Dronkers 
and Avram, 2009; Dronkers and Robert, 2008), but they receive an 
important share of regional funding. 
 
Having created a ranking of different types of schools according to their 
accountability, our strategy is to define a set of variables which basically identify 
each school type on the basis of the “degree of accountability”, measured by the 
share of funding by regional governments, the share of public funding, and their 
nature (public or private). In particular, we define the dummy DECENTR to 
identify the schools located in Regions where this level of government plays an 
important role in education, and the variable PUB_FUND, which measures the 
percentage of total funding in a typical school year coming from public funding 
(including local, regional and central governments). The interaction 
DECENTR×PUB_FUND allows us to differentiate schools according to the degree 
of regional funding, hence test for the “fiscal-accountability” effect. The variable 
PUB_FUND allows us also to somewhat differentiate private-dependent schools 
from private-independent ones, and test the accountability role played by market 
incentives. Finally, the dummy PUBLIC identifies the public nature of schools. 
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Notice that, in most of the literature on schooling, accountability is defined 
according to the role of standardised external exams and other devices, but the role 
of fiscal decentralisation is hardly mentioned. In our exercise, we build a link with 
the fiscal federalism literature, and explicitly control also for the role of fiscal 
decentralization in order to provide a more clear evidence on the accountability role 
played by the different sources of public and private funding. 
As for the econometric specification, we take a very simple route following West and 
Woessmann (2010) and Barankay and Lockwood (2007). Both papers consider an 
education production function where the dependent variable is the test score 
(SCORE), and the covariates can be grouped in regional controls, school controls, 
and (eventually) student controls. The general model to be estimated can be written 
as follows: 
 
∑∑ ++×++
+×+++=
ihihkiki
iiii
XXPUBLICPUBLIC
FUNDPUBDECENTRFUNDPUBDECENTRSCORE
εβββ
βββα
4
321 __  [1] 
 
where i identifies the different schools, the Xh’s are a set of controls deemed to be 
important determinants of school outcomes (including, for instance, the total 
number of students, the share of female students, and the pupils per teacher ratio), 
while Xk are variables to be interacted with PUBLIC in order to identify the 
different institutions providing education in Spain and Italy. According to our 
“accountability” story, we are particularly interested in the coefficients on 
DECENTR, PUB_FUND, PUBLIC, and their interactions. 
 
3.2. The data 
 
We consider the 2003 data from the OECD Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), a widely used survey which takes place every three years to 
collect information on the educational competencies of 15-years-old students in 
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different countries (OECD, 2005a and 2005b). The 2003 wave is particularly 
interesting for our purposes, since it allows us to identify a number of different 
regions within each country. To be more precise, while usually conducted at the 
country level, the 2003 wave makes publicly available for Italy and Spain 
information on some participating regions. In particular, we are able to identify 
Lombardia, Piemonte, Toscana and Veneto as ordinary statute regions, and the two 
Autonomous Provinces of Bolzano and Trento in Italy; the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Castilla y León in Spain. In both countries, we also have a residual 
category of “Other Regions”. According to institutional details discussed above, we 
set the dummy DECENTR equal to one for all the Spanish regions and for the two 
Autonomous Provinces in Italy. Regional funding of schools represents an important 
share of total funding in all these regions, even though there are institutional 
differences across regions. To catch this variation, we consider in particular the 
interaction DECENTR×PUB_FUND.  
 
Educational attainments. PISA surveys report students’ performance through 
plausible values. These need to be thought as random draws from posterior 
distributions of students’ test scores. In other words, instead of obtaining a point 
estimate of student ability, once collecting the raw score for each student on the 
number of correct answers, the distribution of student proficiency is computed, and 
the survey report random values from this (estimated) posterior distribution. 
Needless to say, this requires appropriate tools for the empirical analysis, even for 
descriptive statistics. We will take into account the particular nature of the data by 
considering the PV Stata module discussed in Lauzon (2004) and MacDonald (2008) 
for all our estimates. 
Students’ knowledge and ability (our dependent variable SCORE in Equation [1]) is 
assessed along four main domains: problem solving (PV_PROB), mathematical 
literacy (PV_MATH), reading literacy (PV_READ), and scientific literacy 
(PV_SCIE). Descriptive statistics for these variables for all the schools in the 
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Table A.7. “Market accountability” and “fiscal accountability” (PV_SCIE) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
PUP_TEACH_RATIO 3.640* 4.038* 4.433* 4.453* 4.687 
 [1.924] [2.214] [2.472] [2.405] [2.953] 
TOT_ENROLL 0.0315 0.0304 0.0261 0.0251 0.0297 
 [0.0220] [0.0285] [0.0307] [0.0319] [0.0227] 
SHARE_FEM 0.278 0.400 0.345 0.402 0.381 
 [0.211] [0.249] [0.279] [0.270] [0.256] 
SHORTAGE_SCIE -69.28 -82.46 -73.24 -84.64 -84.34 
 [48.01] [50.68] [50.39] [52.77] [51.97] 
D_SMALL -4.426 -17.30 -8.452 -18.67 -17.06 
 [23.26] [30.15] [26.80] [30.83] [27.84] 
D_LARGE -4.025 -2.773 -5.917 -1.118 -2.085 
 [24.94] [26.93] [28.88] [25.91] [28.01] 
PUB_FUND -0.563***     
 [0.180]     
DECENTR  143.0***    
  [28.01]    
PUB_FUND×DECENTR   0.0423   
   [0.227]   
PUBLIC    13.01  
    [12.70]  
PUBLIC×D_ESP     23.27 
     [27.97] 
PUBLIC×D_ITA     0.984 
     [38.33] 
Regional fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 619 637 619 637 637 
R2 0.9796 0.9772 0.9783 0.9773 0.9774 
Note: Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A.8. The complete model (PV_SCIE) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
PUP_TEACH_RATIO 4.715** 4.556* 4.740** 4.361* 
 [2.314] [2.559] [2.289] [2.354] 
TOT_ENROLL 0.0176 0.0139 0.0213 0.0153 
 [0.0315] [0.0298] [0.0270] [0.0271] 
SHARE_FEM 0.246 0.256 0.226 0.235 
 [0.232] [0.231] [0.213] [0.209] 
SHORTAGE_SCIE -74.43 -74.38 -74.79 -74.94 
 [53.21] [53.02] [53.67] [53.47] 
D_SMALL -6.302 -7.240 -4.760 -5.872 
 [23.07] [22.02] [21.61] [20.56] 
D_LARGE 2.706 3.780 2.298 4.661 
 [18.33] [18.00] [18.54] [16.17] 
PUB_FUND -0.889*** -0.936*** -0.991*** -1.190*** 
 [0.271] [0.266] [0.356] [0.419] 
DECENTR 143.9*** 144.7*** 99.38*** 87.35*** 
 [26.90] [27.11] [36.79] [31.72] 
PUB_FUND×DECENTR   0.403 0.727* 
   [0.407] [0.418] 
PUBLIC 45.87***  43.38**  
 [17.69]  [17.45]  
PUBLIC×D_ESP  40.35*  27.55 
  [24.30]  [24.77] 
PUBLIC×D_ITA  57.20*  69.73** 
  [31.59]  [29.80] 
Regional fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 619 619 619 619 
R2 0.9805 0.9806 0.9807 0.9809 
Note: Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.9. The role of school autonomy (PV_SCIE) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
PUP_TEACH_RATIO 4.827** 4.631* 4.847** 4.448* 
 [2.455] [2.639] [2.440] [2.456] 
TOT_ENROLL 0.0180 0.0130 0.0214 0.0142 
 [0.0311] [0.0310] [0.0270] [0.0284] 
SHARE_FEM 0.237 0.249 0.219 0.226 
 [0.227] [0.229] [0.210] [0.205] 
SHORTAGE_SCIE -74.31 -74.13 -74.67 -74.64 
 [53.02] [52.79] [53.45] [53.16] 
D_SMALL -6.308 -7.588 -4.888 -6.217 
 [23.16] [22.52] [21.77] [21.01] 
D_LARGE 2.210 3.649 1.848 4.566 
 [18.55] [17.77] [18.74] [15.99] 
AUTCURR -4.916 -6.551 -4.274 -7.134 
 [9.502] [8.918] [9.047] [9.665] 
AUTRES -1.128 -1.294 -1.270 -1.765 
 [5.660] [5.678] [5.500] [5.118] 
PUB_FUND -0.900*** -0.967*** -0.998*** -1.236*** 
 [0.271] [0.281] [0.358] [0.465] 
DECENTR 143.3*** 144.1*** 101.8*** 84.78*** 
 [26.29] [26.75] [34.96] [29.54] 
PUB_FUND×DECENTR   0.377 0.752* 
   [0.398] [0.448] 
PUBLIC 42.33*  39.99*  
 [24.33]  [23.36]  
PUBLIC×D_ESP  33.76  19.33 
  [28.43]  [25.08] 
PUBLIC×D_ITA  57.39*  69.89** 
  [31.81]  [30.70] 
Regional fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
R2 0.9806 0.9807 0.9807 0.9810 
Note: Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table A.10. The role of parental background (PV_SCIE) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
PUP_TEACH_RATIO 4.356 4.216 4.381 4.015 
 [2.762] [3.083] [2.728] [2.891] 
TOT_ENROLL 0.0179 0.0147 0.0220 0.0161 
 [0.0273] [0.0248] [0.0229] [0.0221] 
SHARE_FEM 0.217 0.226 0.196 0.205 
 [0.227] [0.222] [0.208] [0.200] 
SHORTAGE_SCIE -78.92 -78.85 -79.34 -79.46 
 [59.07] [58.87] [59.58] [59.27] 
D_SMALL -2.021 -2.869 -0.346 -1.448 
 [19.68] [18.46] [18.30] [17.14] 
D_LARGE -1.201 -0.237 -1.663 0.641 
 [14.48] [14.27] [14.57] [12.41] 
MOTHER_HIGH 82.99 82.70 83.55 83.17 
 [78.49] [79.46] [78.39] [81.09] 
PUB_FUND -0.662** -0.704** -0.769* -0.962** 
 [0.327] [0.300] [0.407] [0.425] 
DECENTR 138.2*** 139.0*** 103.5*** 80.21** 
 [23.82] [23.93] [34.60] [33.24] 
PUB_FUND×DECENTR   0.431 0.744** 
   [0.363] [0.365] 
PUBLIC 43.22***  40.53***  
 [15.24]  [15.36]  
PUBLIC×D_ESP  38.33  25.22 
  [23.92]  [26.49] 
PUBLIC×D_ITA  53.26  66.06** 
  [33.13]  [32.35] 
Regional fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
R2 0.9810 0.9817 0.9818 0.9818 
Note: Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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